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CORPORATE GROUPS AND STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES:
NEW REFORM INSTRUMENTS TO THE CHINESE
YUWA WEI*
INTRODUCTION
The advent of corporate groups is the result of corporate development.' A
corporation can become a shareholder of other corporations by purchasing their
shares.2 By the holding and cross-holding of shares, 3 a number of companies
connected together may form a corporate group.4 The controllers of the group
"may plan, instigate and co-ordinate its managerial, operational and financial
activities on a group basis, while implementing [these activities] through
individual group companies." 5  In doing so, the corporation can enjoy the
advantages of maximizing financial returns, limiting commercial risks and
expanding markets. However, the practice adds new complexities to the already
complicated corporate system, which stems from the fact that the fundamental
norms and legal framework of the corporation had been built up prior to the
emergence of corporate groups in the early-industrialized countries. As a result,
the use of corporate groups inevitably brings certain contradictions and challenges
to the well-established corporate notions and practice.6
Today, most companies of the corporate world belong to different corporate
groups in one way or another.7 Efforts have been made by different legal systems
in favor of developing an effective legal framework to deal with the problems
presented by corporate groups. Basically, two strategies have been predominant.
The first is to create or build a separate legal regime to regulate the operation of
corporate groups 8 German corporate law falls into this class. 9  The second
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1. See ROBERT I. TRICKER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TEXT, READINGS AND
CASES 326 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 327.
4. Id. at 326.
5. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), CORPORATE GROUPS
DISCUSSION PAPER 1.3 (1998).
6. See Cashel, Groups of Companies - Some US Aspects, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES 20-23
(Clive M Schmitthoff& Frank Wooldridge ed. 1991).
7. See Tunc, The Fiduciary Duties of a Dominant Shareholder, in GROUPS OF COMPANIES 1
(Clive M Schmitthoff& Frank Wooldridge ed. 1991).
8. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), supra note 5, at 1.43-
1.48. See generally D.D. Prentice, Groups of Companies: The English Experience, in GROUPS OF
COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS 36 (Klaus J. Hopt ed. 1982).
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involves conditionally abandoning traditional principles of corporate law and
applying specially designed legal structures for corporate groups, upon the
occurrence of certain events. This principle is generally applied by Anglo-
American systems.' 0
Since the 1970s, the People's Republic of China has undertaken a great deal
of effort to establish a network for enterprise cooperation for the purpose of
enhancing the competitive ability of its enterprises." Various trials were carried
out, including setting up various enterprise alliances (lian ying), enterprise groups
(qi yie ji tuan) and corporate groups (ji tuan gong si).12 China's 1994 Company
Law13 only addresses the terminology of parent companies and subsidiaries, but
has no further provisions specific to corporate groups. 14 The 1986 Civil Code5
does not contain a definition of corporate group, but only defines an enterprise
alliance as 'a joint operation between enterprises or an enterprise and an
institution.' 16 Such a joint operation may result in the establishment of a new legal
entity or a partnership, or may be simply based on a cooperative contract. 17 With
the development of corporate practice, the patchy provisions relating to enterprise
alliances in the 1986 Civil Code become less and less relevant. China urgently
needs to develop an effective legal framework to guide the practice of corporate
groups, because more and more state-owned enterprises are being "corporatized"
and most newly established firms take the form of a company.
This article will first examine the theoretical challenges and difficulties
brought by corporate groups. Part II of this article will introduce the development
of corporate groups and other forms of business alliances in China. Finally, Part
III will discuss how the problem of corporate groups has been tackled by other
jurisdictions so as to provide some wisdom and inspirations for the Chinese
government's legislative and practical efforts in this arena.
I. THE THEORETICAL ISSUES CONCERNING CORPORATE GROUPS
A. The Abuse of Separate Personality and Limited Liability
Separate personality and limited liability form the basis for the modem
corporation.' 8 The vitality and attraction of the corporate structure rest on its
predictability to investors.' 9 It makes it possible for investors to evaluate their
9. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), supra note 5, at 1.49.
10. See id. at 1.27-1.31.
11. See YIPENG LIU ET AL., COMPLETE WORKS ON THE COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR PRACTICE 18 (1994) [hereinafter "COMPETE WORKS"].
12. See id.
13. See Company Law of the People's Republic of China (1994) [hereinafter "Company Law"].
14. See id. at arts. 12 & 13 (1994).
15. See General Principles of Civil Law (1986).
16. See id. at arts. 51, 52 & 53 (1986).
17. Id.
18. See L.B.C. GOWER, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 88 (1992).
19. See generally C.A. COOKE, CORPORATION TRUST AND COMPANY 39-50 (1950).
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business risks and liabilities. 20 These qualities were foreseen by those founding
fathers of modern corporate law. In designing corporate laws, they had the clear
view of designing a business form that would protect individual investors through
preventing their investment from triggering unlimited personal liability. As the
holding of shares of other companies was generally forbidden by laws at that time,
the doctrines of separate personality and limited liability were, for a time, thought
to be sufficient.21 However, problems arose when limited liability was needed to
extend to holding companies. 22  This then introduced limited liability within
limited liabilities.23
Portfolio investment by corporations was generally permitted by the end of
nineteenth century, as a means of pooling resources and sharing profits.24 The
conventional concepts of separate personality and limited liability began to apply
to holding companies and started to experience crises. 25 Since the purpose of the
existence of groups of companies is to achieve an optimal performance of the
group as a whole,26 this goal sometimes necessitates the sacrifice of an individual
company's benefits in order to maximize the gains of the whole group.
For example, to implement a strategy that is good for the group, a parent
company may instruct a particular subsidiary to sell raw materials to another
subsidiary at a low price and to buy the products manufactured by the first
company at a high price. In doing so, the group makes gains at the expense of the
interests of outside shareholders and creditors of that particular subsidiary. In such
cases, business is fragmented among the component companies of the group, and
limited liability and separate personality are used to "protect each fragment of the
business from liability for the obligations of all the other fragments".27 Hence, it
becomes evident that the traditional doctrines of corporate separate personality and
limited liability are no longer adequate in dealing with corporate groups.
In relation to corporate governance, corporate groups pose the question of
how the directors of the companies of the same group direct their loyalties. How
do they comprehend and judge the concept of "for the best interests of the
company" when they make their business decisions, especially in a situation where
there is a conflict of interest between the group as a whole and the individual
companies to which they owe their duty of loyalty? With the increasing
20. See Cashel, supra 6, at 24.
21. The power to purchase other companies' shares, without specific authorization to do so, was
firmly forbidden by the common law at the early stage of corporate history. See PHILLIP I BLUMBERG,
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 56, 61 (1987). See also Great Eastern
Ry. v. Turner, 8 L.R. Ch. App. 149, 151-152 (1872); In re William Thomas & Co. v. Sully, 1 Ch. 325,
329-330 (1915).
22. See Cashel, supra note 6, at 24.
23. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERO, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 58-59 (1993).
24. See BLUMBERG, supra note 23, at xl.
25. See generally id, at 3-61.
26. See GOWER, supra 18, at 334.
27. See BLUMBERG, supra note 23, at 59.
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domination of corporate groups in the world and the national economies, every
corporate system has to give adequate attention to the issues posed by corporate
groups, such as remedial mechanisms for outside shareholders (e.g., non-group
members) and duties of controlling companies.
B. The Strategies of Regulating Corporate Groups
In the conventional sense, corporate groups disturb the balance of power
between management and the companies concerned. As a result, the fate of the
subsidiary companies is decided by someone other than their direct management
and board of directors. This is a problem that every corporate system has to face.
Different strategies have developed. While some systems regulate a corporate
group as a single entity, others adopt the approach of conditionally disregarding
the separate personality of individual companies of the group. While some
systems allow greater freedom to the controlling companies, others may have
stricter rules relating to the exercise of power by parent companies.28 The best
example of this could be the divergence between German law and the common
law.
Germany was the first country to have a separate legal regime, here in the
form of the Aktiengesetz, as a way of regulating groups of companies. 29 The law
stipulates strict rules of disclosure.30 It defines the situations of contractual group
relations, de facto group relations and integrated group relations.3 ' Once a
company falls into the category of group companies, it is regulated by a different
32and self-inclusive set of rules in terms of liabilities and corporate governance.
The rules clarify the responsibility of holding company managers to the
subsidiaries, and the liability of a holding company to the debts of the
subsidiaries. 33  While a parent company enjoys the freedom of directing its
subsidiaries, it has to fully indemnify the subsidiaries' losses caused by its
decisions within the next accounting period. 4 In other words, the German law
treats a corporate group as a single entity. Hence, it is a logical conclusion that this
entity exists to pursue the interests of the group as a whole. Later, German courts
also developed a body of leading cases, which has further enhanced the potential of
the German law in relation to the regulation of corporate groups.
3 5
In common law jurisdictions, groups of companies are gradually brought
under effective control by extensively introducing statutory rules concerning
28. See Eddy Wymeersch, A Status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in
Some Continental European States, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE
ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 1066-1067 (Klaus J. Hopt et al. eds. 1998).
29. The separate legal regime, Aktiengesetz, was produced in 1965.
30. See Aktiengesetz at §§ 20-21, available at http://www.aktiengesetz.de.
31. See BLUMBERG, supra note 23, at 161.
32. See id.
33. See Aktiengesetz, supra note 29, at sec. 309, 317 & 322.
34. See Wymeersch, supra note 28, at 1066.
35. See Hopt, Legal Elements and Policy Decisions in Regulating Groups of Companies, in
GROUPS OF COMPANIES 84 (Clive M Schmitthoff& Frank Wooldridge ed. 1991
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corporate groups.36 In the early stages, traditional law, based on the doctrine of
separate personality and limited liability, was unable to deal effectively with
corporate groups.37 As a result, equity jurisprudence developed the concept of
"piercing the corporate veil". "Piercing the corporate veil" refers to the situation
where courts disregard the principle of separate personality by treating companies
within a group as a single entity. 38 However, the remedy was still inadequate, as it
was only available in "rare" and "exceptional" situations. 39 The situation did not
improve until a sophisticated doctrine of "control" was generally adopted by the
common law jurisdictions. 40 The United States has taken the lead in this process.
The concept of "control" typically refers to situations where a company has the
power to direct or command the direction of management or policies of another
company. It is used to determine the demarcation of selective abandonment of the
traditional principle of corporate personality, and the demarcation of selective
application of enterprise principles, a system of rules specially designed for
regulating corporate groups. Once a company satisfies certain conditions, it is
assumed to have control over another company. 41 Thus, the relationship between
the companies should be regulated by the enterprise principles.42 Enterprise
principles impose "legal obligations upon [the] parent corporation or other
affiliated corporations of the group for acts of a subsidiary participating in the
collective conduct of a common integrated enterprise. '" 3  When enterprise
principles apply, the corporate group is treated as a single entity.
The difference between the German approach and the Anglo-American
approach lies in the fact that the Anglo-American model persists in the separate
entity approach. In this system, "each company in a corporate group is a separate
legal entity with its own rights and duties." 44 Therefore, parent companies do not
36. See generally Prentice, supra note 8, at 99-129.
37. See Phillip I. Blumberg, National Law and Transnational Groups and Transactions: Survey of
the American Experience, 5 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 295, 297 (1995).
38. See Prentice, supra note 8, at 101.
39. See Blumberg, supra note 37, at 298.
40. See BLUMERG, supra note 233, at 153-61.
41. "Control" is universally used to determine group relationship. However, different systems
have different interpretations regarding its content. For example, in the USA, "control" means "the
power, directly or indirectly, to exercise a controlling influence over the management and policies of a
company." It can be exerted either by the ownership of voting securities, or one or more intermediary
persons, or by contract, etc. A person who, alone or jointly with others, owns or has the power to vote
more than twenty-five percent of the outstanding voting securities of a company is presumed to have
the control over that company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9)(2001). In the UK, a company is assumed to
have control or influence over another company, if it is a member and controls the composition of the
latter's cord of directors, or if it controls half the nominal value of the latter's voting share capital. See
Prentice, supra note 8, at 99.
42. See PHILLIP I. BLUMERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 24-25 (1983).
43. See Blumberg, supra note 377, at 296. For a comprehensive overview of the areas of
American law in which enterprise principles have superseded traditional entity concepts of corporate
law, see generally Phillip I. Blumberg, The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in
Determining Parent and Subsidiary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CONN. L. REV. 295 (1996).
44. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), supra note 5, at 1.28.
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automatically become parties to contracts entered into by subsidiaries with external
parties, nor do they become automatically liable for the debts of the subsidiaries. 4s
Directors owe their primary duties to their individual companies and they should
make business decisions for the good of their own companies. 46 Directors can take
the group's welfare into consideration only if there is no conflict of interest, and
may be liable if they make a decision that benefits the group as a whole but
detriments their own individual companies. This doctrine has been firmly accepted
by the courts of Anglo-American jurisdictions. For instance, in the English case
Charterbridge Corp., Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank,47 Justice Pennycuick rejected the view
that the directors in a subsidiary could have acted with a view to the benefit of the
group as a whole, without giving separate consideration to the interests of their
own company. His Lordship said, "[e]ach company in the group is a separate legal
entity and the directors of a particular company are not entitled to sacrifice the
interest of that company. This becomes apparent when one considers the case
where the particular company has separate creditors. ' 48 In the Australian case
Equiticorp Fin. Ltd. (in liq) v. Bank of New Zealand,49 Justices Clarke and Cripps
took an even stricter view in relation to breach of directors' duties, stating that "[a]
preferable view may be that where the directors have failed to consider the
interests of the relevant company they should be found to have committed a breach
of duty. If, however, the transaction was objectively viewed in the interests of the
company, then no consequences would flow from the breach." 50
Single enterprise principles apply where there is the possibility of victimizing
creditors and minority shareholders. The general view is that single enterprise
principles supersede separate entity principles upon the occurrence of certain
events stipulated in a jurisdiction's corporate legal regime. Comparatively, the
single entity model of Germany is generally perceived as advantageous in coping
with the problems of corporate groups.,51 One certainty is that this approach is
definitely closer to economic reality, 52 and the adoption of this model is beneficial
in terms of reducing practical and theoretical complexities associated with
providing an appropriate legal system to govern corporate groups.
45. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), supra note 5, at 1.28.
46. A clear example can be found in the UK company law and Australian company law. The UK
has developed the principle in its case law that directors of each company should, in deciding what
transactions their company should enter into, consider the interests of that company rather than the
interests of the group as a whole. The leading case is Charterbridge Corp., Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank [1969] 2
All E.R. 1185. Charterbridge Corp. is applied by Australian courts. In their leading case, Walker v.
Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1, Mason, J. insisted that in the group context, it is a fundamental principle
that directors must consider the interests of the separate entity and further, they must consider its
interest alone.
47. See Charterbridge Corp., Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank [1969] 2 All E.R. 1185.
48. See Charterbridge, supra note 477, at 1193.
49. See Equiticorp Fin. Ltd. (in liq) v. Bank of New Zealand (1993) 11 A.C.S.R. 642.
50. See Equiticorp Fin. Ltd., supra note 49, at 1019.
51. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), supra note 5, at 1.44 -
1.48. See also ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 82-83 (1976).
52. See COMPANIES & SECURITIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE (AUSTRALIA), supra note 5, at 1.44.
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II. THE ISSUES OF CORPORATE GROUPS IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT
A. The Historical Development of Corporate Groups in China
The Chinese leadership has long had the intention of establishing an efficient
business network in China in order to foster economies of scale and to improve
firm performance. 3 However, the aspiration of establishing enterprise groups was
constantly frustrated by political and other reasons. As early as in 1948, Liu
Shaoqi, the first vice-president of the PRC, made the suggestion of establishing a
corporate system that nurtured enterprise alliances in China.54 When Liu Shaoqi
and Deng Xiaoping were in charge of economic development in the early 1960s,
they frequently made a point of learning from the experience of establishing trusts
and economic monopoly in developed countries so as to enhance the productive
capacity of the state-owned enterprises." In 1964, the first twelve trusts were put
in trial use." Some trusts were made up of enterprises making the same products
for the purpose of unification of management. Some trusts comprised enterprises
of main products and by-products for the purpose of comprehensive utilization of
resources. As China strictly held the economic doctrines of the planned economy
at that time, a trust was defined as an economic organization of socialist public
ownership with a central management. 57 In other words, a trust was an economic
unit with independent accounts that carried out business activities under state
plans.58 The historical situation determined that these trusts were established as a
result of the state's administrative arrangement, rather than voluntary coalitions
among enterprises. 59 Although the goal of establishing the trust system was to
increase managerial efficiency, it was questionable whether it could significantly
reduce administrative intervention at a time when state plans penetrated every
aspect of economic activities. 60  Before the trial was completed, the Cultural
Revolution began, which put the practice of trusts to an end.61
Since the economic reforms in 1970s, enterprises were given a certain degree
of autonomy.62 As the enterprises were allowed to retain part of the profits they
generated, it became possible for the enterprises to freely form their business
alliances. As a result, various forms of enterprise alliances appeared.63  The
Chinese government believed that the development of these enterprise alliances
53. See JIANMIN DOU, RESEARCH ON THE CORPORATE IDEOLOGY IN CHINA 96 (1999).
54. See Liu SHAOQI, THE SELECTIVE WORKS OF LIU SHAOQI 429 (1981).
55. See DoU, supra note 53, at 96-97.
56. See id. at 98.
57. See STATE ECONOMIC COUNCIL, Report on Establishing Trusts in Industry and
Transportation Sectors 1964, in THE COLLECTION OF INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE P.R.C. 1949-1981 (1981).
58. See id.
59. See PING JIANG & XUDONG ZHAO, THE SYSTEM OF LEGAL PERSON 364-365.
60. See Dou, supra note 53, at 99.
61. See id. at 100.
62. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 365.
63. See id.
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served the purpose of its economic reforms, and thus provided legal and policy
support for the exercise. 64 At a time when the planned economy was still playing
the dominant role and the market economy only played a supplementary role,65 this
type of free combination among enterprises was helpful in relation to improving
the situation of self-isolation in different areas and different sectors caused by the
planned economic structure. Because of a lack of legal definitions, all kinds of
alliances were generally called horizontal economic alliance (lian ying or heng
xiang ing ji lian he), in contrast with the vertical relationship between
administrative departments and their controlled enterprises in traditional enterprise
system.66
Later, the 1986 Civil Code67 classified different types of economic alliances.68
According to the Civil Code, there were three types of economic alliances: first,
economic alliances that create a new legal entity (legal entity alliance); second,
economic alliances that do not create a new legal entity (partnership alliance); and
third, economic alliances based on a contract (contractual alliance). 69  Strictly
speaking, the three economic alliances described were, in fact, not corporate
groups, but special types of business cooperations that were a joint product of
China's planned economy and the economic reforms being undertaken. Apart
from some provisions in the Civil Code, there were also few legal documents
regulating these economic alliances.70 Since these provisions and regulations
attempted to use uniformed rules to regulate different types of economic alliances,
they were obviously inadequate and defective. If this were to happen in Western
systems, these different economic alliances would had been regulated by different
sets of laws. For example, while legal entity alliances should be regulated by
corporate laws, partnership alliances and contractual alliances would be governed
by partnership laws, contract laws and joint venture laws.
Furthermore, there are other defects in Chinese legislation concerning
economic alliances. For instance, the economic alliance creating a new legal entity
was bound by limited but rigid rules.7' The binding tie of the alliance was not
shareholding or interlocking directorship, but a cooperative contract.72 The
alliance ceased to exist once the contract was terminated.73 The parties to the
64. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 365.
65. This composed the macro-economic structure at the early stage of the economic reforms.
66. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 365.
67. See General Principles of Civil Law, supra note 15.
68. See id. at arts. 51-53.
69. Id.
70. These legal documents include: STATE COUNCIL, Provisional Regulations Concerning
Promoting Economic Alliances (1980); STATE COUNCIL, Regulations concerning Problems of Further
Promoting Economic Alliances (1986); STATE ADMINISTRATIvE BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND
COMMERCE, Administrative Procedure of Registering Economic Alliances (1986); and MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, Regulations Concerning Accounting Problems in Economic Alliances. See Jiang & Zhao,
supra note 59, at 366.
71. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 373.
72. See id.
73. See Supreme Court's Answers to the Questions Arisen from the Trials Involving Co-operative
Contracts, art. 7 (1990).
VOL. 30:3
CORPORATE GROUPS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
alliance had no duty to disclose the contents of the contract to the third party, but
had the right to freely withdraw their invested funds.74 Moreover, there were no
requirements on consolidated accounts and unified management of the group. As a
result, the third party was left unprotected in the transactions with the economic
alliance. 75 The arrangement also created uncertainties in the cooperation, as parties
could terminate their contract at any time.76
The rules regulating China's partnership alliances brought even more
confusion. The Civil Code distinguished between partnerships consisting of
individuals and partnerships consisting of enterprises (partnership alliance).77
While individual partners took unlimited liabilities, enterprise partners only did so
if there were clear statements about their joint and unlimited liabilities in laws or in
the cooperative contracts. This provided the opportunity for the parties to such
alliances to avoid liability and to victimize the creditors and other third parties.
78
With the deepening of China's economic reforms, the need to further advance
the cooperation between enterprises increased. The existing economic alliances
were not competent enough to accommodate the increasingly comprehensive
enterprise cooperation and consequently, a new type of economic alliance,
enterprise groups, emerged.79 In China, the practice of enterprise groups started at
the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, and soon became dominant.80 In the
beginning, there was no clear definition of an enterprise group. 8' An enterprise
group was generally perceived as a form of business alliance that could deliver
larger scale cooperation among enterprises. 2 It was an aggregation of a large
number of individual enterprises. The advantages of enterprise groups were
several, and included accelerating the enterprise specialization, promoting
technology development, and reducing informational asymmetries by facilitating
the flow of information among enterprises.8 3
Although the enterprise groups have served important practical purposes in
China and have been used as leverage by the Chinese government to assist
enterprise reforms, little legal attention has been given to them. Up to now, there
is no definition of enterprise groups contained in any Chinese legislative sources.
However, academic discussions concerning enterprise groups have gradually
produced a sophisticated understanding of the term. In the early stages, an
enterprise group was defined as an "economic alliance consisting of a number of
enterprises of different areas and different trades," or "an economic organization
74. See STATE COUNCIL, Regulations Concerning Problems of Further Promoting Economic
Alliances, art. 5 (1986).
75. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 374.
76. See id. at 375.
77. See General Principles of Civil Law, supra note 15, at arts. 30-35 & 52.
78. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 378.




83. See id. at 384.
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,84with multiple levels to answer the need of large scale of economy". It is clear
that the above descriptions do not capture the essence of the relationship. Later
works provide clearer views on the nature of enterprise groups. Some point out
that the essential characteristic of an enterprise group lies in its central
management.8 5  Therefore, an enterprise group has come to be defined as an
economic alliance consisting of a number of legal entities and based on a central
management.8 6
The lack of legal regulation relating to the practice of enterprise groups may
soon end. The Chinese government is aware of the urgency of producing a legal
framework to control the practice of enterprise groups. With the launching of the
enterprise reform, the corporation becomes the focus of the country's economic
activities.8 7 It is predictable that China will head in the direction of standardizing
the activities of its economic alliances by introducing the practice of corporate
groups into its legal system.
B. The Perception of Corporate Groups
Both the Chinese government and the country's intellectuals are well aware of
the importance of business groups to an economy. 88 Based on models from the
United States, Germany, and Japan, the government and intellectuals have seen
how business groups function to increase economic efficiency by internalizing
market transactions within corporate groups. They are also aware of the fact that
business groups have facilitated the rapid industrialization in some late-
industrialized countries such as Japan and South Korea.8 9 Hence, it is believed that
developing China's large business groups with similar structural features of those
in the above-above mentioned countries will speed up the process of economic
modernization in China.90
The practice of business groups in China is still in a primitive stage. The
country's existing enterprise groups, in fact, amount to joint ventures in a loose
sense. They are small in size and lack stability. As discussed in the previous
section, the tie binding individual enterprises to an enterprise group is a contractual
agreement, rather than shareholdings. 91 In China, it is common for the individual
enterprises of an enterprise group not to comply with the decisions of the central
84. See Guan Xiaofeng, About the Nature and Legal Position of Enterprise Groups, 3 Zheng Fa
Lun Tan 51-55 (1988).
85. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 390.
86. See id. at 391.
87. See XIANGYI XU, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MODERN COMPANIES 242 (1999).
88. See DOu, supra note 533, at 148-50.
89. See Lisa A. Keister, Engineering Growth: Business Group Structure and Firm Performance in
China's Transition Economy, 104 AM. J. Soc. 404, 404-06 (1998). See generally Eun Mee Kim, The
Industrial Organization and Growth of the Korean Chaebol: Integrating Development and
Organizational Theories, in BUSINESS NETWORKS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT N EAST AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA 272-99 (Gary Hamilton ed.) (1988), available at
http://gsis.ewha.ac.kr/faculty/faculty6.htm (last visited January 19, 2002).
90. See Keister, supra note 89, at 404.
91. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 392.
VOL. 30:3
CORPORATE GROUPS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
management of the group.92 Some hold that the situation of lack of compliance
will change, if the enterprises of a business group are brought together through the
holding and cross-holding of shares among the enterprises of the group.93 Hence,
it is necessary to introduce a stockholding mechanism into China's enterprise
groups. 94 This will become reality before long, as the current enterprise reform is a
process of achieving general "corporatization." 95  Upon the completion of the
reform, most Chinese enterprises will be transferred into companies.96 The
enterprise groups will certainly be replaced by corporate conglomerates.
97
It is believed that the Chinese government should take the responsibility for
designing an effective corporate group system for the country.98 The experience of
Japan and South Korea demonstrates that governmental guidance and support have
been important in fostering the dynamic corporate group systems of those two
countries, which, in return, have remarkably enhanced the competitive capacity of
their corporations in the international market. 99 In China, most large and important
enterprises are state-owned enterprises which, after the "corporatization," have
remained and will remain as state-owned or controlled companies. The situation
makes the government's role become even more significant in the process of
establishing a corporate group system.' 00 The enterprise reform may enable the
government to kill two birds with one stone, by "corporatizing" state-owned
enterprises on one hand, and assembling them into corporate groups on the other.
Companies should be bound to a group by the shareholding mechanism and
by contracts. Shareholding is a crucial mechanism of sustaining control in the
group structure.' 0' It is recommended that the vertical and horizontal shareholding
relationships should all be introduced into the Chinese enterprise system. 10 2 By
establishing holding or parent companies, a corporate group forms a hierarchical
chain of control among companies. This is the so-called vertical shareholding
group. Meanwhile, it is suggested that the experience of cross-shareholding
widely exercised by the Japanese keiretsu is also worth emulating. 103 The Chinese
92. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59,. at 393. See also Li Su, Reforming the Enterprise Groups by
Introducing Shareholding Mechanism Is Inevitable, 4 LEGAL COMMENTS 51-57 (1987).
93. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 59, at 393.
94. See Xu, supra note 87, at 250.
95. The Fifteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (1997) pointed out that
further economic reforms should focus on reforming large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises
into normative corporations, so as to set up a modem enterprise system in China. This indicated the
initiation of the "Big Bang" package of China's enterprise reform. Since then "corporatization" has
carried out at an ever-larger scale in China.
96. See The Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues
Concerning the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises, September 22, 1999, available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cndher/archive.html (last visited Sept. 27, 1999).
97. See id.
98. See XU, supra note 87, at 228-229.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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call this type of shareholding structure a "horizontal shareholding structure" and
intend to utilize the method to form the marriages between core companies, so as
to achieve a "strong and strong combination" (qiang qiang lian he).
1' 4
The 1994 Company Lawt0 5 is primarily drafted to regulate single
companies.10 6  There are nearly no provisions about corporate groups, except
articles 12 and 13 which permit a company to establish subsidiaries. 10 7 Producing
legal guidance for the practice of corporate groups should be the top priority of the
government. At the moment, academic discussions have not yet reached an
agreement on the legislative method for doing so. While some suggest having a
separate law to regulate corporate groups, others recommend inserting special
provisions for corporate groups.'0 8 An alternative view is to regulate corporate
groups by the joint work of all relevant laws including company law, taxation law,
and anti-trust law.'0 9
Although it is not clear whether China will take the single entity approach or
separate entity approach, the control test in Anglo-American systems is well-
received in academic discussions. t° Attention is also directed to the issue of
protecting minority shareholders. On December 21, 1999, during the 13th Session
of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee, China's top
legislature examined and deliberated on the Draft Amendments to the Corporate
Law."' It is expected that the forthcoming amended Company Law will provide
indications about the direction of future development of the Chinese law on
corporate groups.
III. THE EXTENSION OF CORPORATE GROUPS: COOPERATIVE
STRATEGIES - STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND NETWORKS
The corporate group is a device of resource allocation in a market economy. It
is the third transaction mechanism after markets and the firm. Markets and the firm
are alternative choices for transactions. Depending on their comparative efficiency
or advantages, people can choose to execute their transactions either cross-markets
or within a firm." 2 While firms have developed to reduce the transaction costs
occurred in the market by internalizing transactions, they can also be costly due to
scale diseconomies or control losses.i 13 Thus, corporate groups are used to fill the
104. See XU, supra note 87, at 228-229.
105. See Company Law, supra note 13.
106. See PING JIANG & LIUFANG FANG, NEW CORPORATE LAW TEXTBOOK 221 (1998).
107. See id.
108. See Jiang & Zhao, supra note 11, at 405.
109. See id. at 409-411.
110. See id. at 392-411. See also XU, supra note 87, at 250-253.
111. Chinese lawmakers attending the ongoing 13th session of the National People's Congress
(NPC) Standing Committee, China's top legislature, examined and deliberated the Draft Amendment to
the Corporate Law on December 21. See Chinese Lawmakers Deliberate Draft Amendment to
Corporate Law, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, December 23, 1999, at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/special/soe/ 1999122300S101.html (last visited Nov. 11,2001).
112. See Akira Goto, Business Groups in a Market Economy, 19 EUR. ECON. REV. 53, 60 (1982).
113. See id. at61.
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gap. Using corporate groups to execute transactions can avoid the transaction costs
that would have been incurred by using markets and the costs caused by expansion
of the firm."14 Firms have strong incentives to form or join a group, when the
benefit of forming or joining a group exceeds that of using the market and firm
mechanisms."1
5
However, business groups are not the only alternative of markets and the firm.
In fact, hierarchical relationships within firms and explicit market relations
between firms are just "the extreme points of an organizational spectrum," and
"hybrid forms of organization [which] occupy the intervening space. ' 16 These
hybrid forms include not only business groups but also cooperative strategies
comprising strategic alliances and business networks. In certain circumstances, for
certain business purposes, strategic alliances and business networks have
advantages over corporate groups.
A corporate group, in essence, is a formal cooperative arrangement. There
have to be some kind of formal or binding links existing between the members of
the corporate group, including common parent, cross shareholdings, and
interchange of directorships. Costs are incurred in the process of establishing,
maintaining and effectively using these binding links to achieve business purposes.
Furthermore, forming or joining a corporate group is not the desirable solution for
achieving certain business purposes in certain business environments. For
example, to enter into an industry or regional sector by acquiring or establishing
subsidiaries may be infeasible according to a country's law."17 In this situation, it is
desirable to do business through strategic alliances and networks.
Strategic alliances are defined as to include "joint ventures, collaborations,
and consortia.' '"8 A joint venture is usually either a partnership or something
closely allied to partnership, although it can take the form a joint venture company.
Compared with a joint venture, other types of alliances are looser forms of
cooperation such as product swaps, production licenses and technology
alliances." 9  A network is also a loose form of business cooperation. To
distinguish a network from other types of alliances, one needs to look at the
purpose of using networks and alliances.
Firms go into a joint venture or an alliance for avoidance of the uncertainty
inherent in market transactions and the costs of establishing hierarchies. The
strength of joint ventures and alliances lies in their ability of promoting
organizational learning. By joining joint ventures and alliances, technological
114. See Goto, supra note 112 at 61.
115. See id.
116. See BUREAU OF INDUSTRY EcONOMICs (AUSTRALIA), NETWORKS: A THIRD FORM OF
ORGANIZATION 7 (1991). See also the detailed discussions and analyses on this issue in OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 206-39 (1985).
117. See JOHN CHILD & DAVID FAULKNER, STRATEGIES OF COOPERATION: MANAGING
ALLIANCES, NETwORKS AND JOINT VENTURES 2 (1998).
118. See id. at 6.
119. See CHILD, supra note 117, at 9.
120. See id. at 66.
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and managerial know-how and knowledge are transferred and exchanged among
partners, new product researche and development are jointly carried out, and
employees are jointly trained. In addition, firms are motivated by the challenge of
entering into international market to set up joint ventures and alliances. 12 ' This is
because the choices of doing business in a target market are limited. In some
situations, apart from direct exporting, a firm has to make a choice between
licensing, counter-trade, product swap, or setting up a joint venture.'
22
Contrasting strategic alliances, the strength of networks lies in their
specialization, adaptability and flexibility, not necessary in learning
opportunities. 123 Networks exist for the reason that members of a network are
complementary and synergistic in relation to functions and contribution. 2 4 A
typical scenario is that a firm finds its customers, distributors or suppliers in its
network. The bonds of the network are usually friendship, trust and
interdependence. 12  Consequently, a network suggests close but non-exclusive
relationships.
Recently, the function and advantage of cooperative strategies including
strategic alliances and networks have been increasingly acknowledged. 26 This is
because the economic globalization requires more effective business devices for
global competition, and the technology development has provided opportunities for
more flexible business arrangements by reducing the costs of communication.127 It
is interesting to see, with increasing exploitation of these strategies, what influence
the practice may impose on corporate development.
Since opening up, China has effectively used many types of strategic alliances
to assist its economic reforms. 28 These strategies have proven to be remarkably
successful in attracting foreign investment to serve the purpose of the reforms.
29
Chinese-foreign joint ventures and other types of Chinese-foreign alliances play an
important role in China's rapid economic development.13 0 Internally, the Chinese
government has also encouraged enterprise cooperation. Recently, discussions
about enhancing enterprise strength by promoting enterprise cooperation have
increased. 13 1 However, more attention has been paid to the formation of corporate
groups and some close forms of cooperation. It seems the importance of informal
cooperative arrangements, particularly business networks, has not been sufficiently
addressed in China.
121. See CHILD, supra note 117, at 67.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 7.
124. See id. at 113.
125. See BUREAU OF INDUSTRY ECONOMICS (AUSTRALIA), supra note 116, at 9.
126. See id. at 14.
127. See id. at 1 & 14-15.
128. See generally YUWA WEI, INVESTING IN CHINA: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF JOINT VENTURES
73-81 (2000).
129. See WEI, supra note 128, at 10-13.
130. See id.
131. See Xu, supra note 87, at 238.
VOL. 30:3
CORPORATE GROUPS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
CONCLUSIONS
The development of corporate groups is the choice of economic development.
Firm production reduces the transaction costs of using the market mechanism.
However, there is an organizational cost for using firms. Business groups offer an
alternative transaction mechanism that, under certain circumstances, is more
efficient than the market mechanism and internal organization. 132  Corporate
groups have shown power in terms of facilitating economies of scale. To exist in
groups makes corporations become fitter and more adapted to encountering the
challenges brought about by increasing market competition and globalization.
The formation of corporate groups is one of the most significant components
of China's enterprise reform. The Chinese government is planning a corporate
system with strong corporate groups to ensure that the existing enterprises can
survive the pressure from further opening up and to gain a share in international
competition. The practice and the law making are still progressing. The
experience of corporate groups in different systems provides rich resources for the
Chinese to selectively take in suitable practice and make appropriate legal
transplants. In today's China, apart from the focus on corporate groups, adequate
attention should also be paid to the issue of how to foster informal cooperation
among Chinese firms, such as strategic alliances and networks. In a fast changing
environment fueled by economic globalization and rapid technologic innovation, it
is important to be aware that "informal cooperative arrangements are fundamental
to the success of decentralized economic organization".I33
132. See Goto, supra note 112, at 61.
133. See BUREAU OF INDUSTRY ECONOMICS (AUSTRALIA), supra note 116, at 1.
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